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THE CANADIAN BAR REVIEW [VOL. XL
admission of statements of this kind." 47 "The inconsistency may
relate only to matters not in issue or to such minor or irrelevant
matters that it would be unfair to the witness and the opposite
party to allow cross-examination and the trial Judge could only
decide this if he had before him evidence as to the content of the
alleged inconsistent statement ; . . ." 48
(3) If the judge exercises his discretion in favour of allowing the
inconsistent statement to be proven, he should, in the presence
of the jury, direct that the circumstances of the making of the
statement be put to the witness and that he be asked whether he
made the statement. If the witness admits making the statement
that, of course, obviates having to prove this by other evidence.
If the witness further admits that the facts in the statement are
true then it becomes admissible evidence in the action.
(4) If the witness denies making the former statement then this
can be proved by other evidence.
(5) The judge should instruct the jury that unless the witness
admits that the former statement is true, the making of it is not
evidence of the facts contained therein but is solely for the purpose
of proving that the witness made the statement. The jury then
must decide to what extent this new piece of evidence neutralizes
the testimony given in the witness box.
J. W. MORDEN *
CONFLICT OF LAWS-CONTRACT-PROPER LAW-FOREIGN EX-
CHANGE CONTROL REGULATIONS.-In Etler v. Kertesz,l the evi-
dence disclosed that the plaintiff and the defendant had both
lived in Hungary and "now and then resided and worked in
Vienna" where they met in 1949 . At that time, the defendant, who
was contemplating departure to the United States of America,
needed five hundred dollars for the journey. He borrowed the
money from the plaintiff who had in his possession some American
dollars he had brought with him from Hungary, and agreed to
repay him in Zurich, Switzerland, in the same currency . The loan
not having been repaid, the plaintiff obtained a judgment in his
favour in the Province of Quebec which he then sought to enforce
against the defendant in Ontario. The Ontario Court of Appeal
47 Ibid., per Porter C.J.O., at pp . 399 (D.L.R.), 500 (O.R .) .
4s Ibid., per MacKay J.A., at pp . 426 (D.L.R .), 535 (O.R .) .
*J . W. Morden, of the Ontario Bar, Toronto.
1 [1960] O.R . 672, per Porter C.J.O .
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refused to give effect to the Quebec judgment, on the ground that
the defendant had not been personally served with the writ of
summons in the Quebec action and had entered no defence.2
Thereupon, the court proceeded to hear argument on the merits .
The defendant maintained that the contract was unenforce-
able in Ontario, because, at the time when the loan was made, the
law of Austria provided that contracts involving dealings in foreign
currency, unless authorized by the Austrian National Bank or some
special dealers, were "unenforceable, void, invalid and illegal. Such
contracts were not allowed, they were prohibited and the offender
was liable to punishment"éa The contract, if governed by the law
of Austria, was illegal at its inception under the Austrian exchange
control legislation.
The issue before the court was a simple one : ". . , whether the
proper law of the contract is the law of Austria, the lex loci con-
tractus, or the law of Switzerland, the lex loci solutionis?" 4 In
ascribing a meaning to the expression "proper low of a contract",
the court quoted with approval I3icey's definition s to the effect that
In this Digest the term "proper law of a contract" means the law, or
laws, by which the parties intended, or may fairly be presumed to
have intended, the contract to be governed ; or (in other words) the
law or laws to which the parties intended or may fairly be presumed
to have intended to submit themselves .
The parties not having expressed their intention, the court also
quoted Dicey's prima facie presumption in favour of the lex
loci contractus or the lex loci solutionis.s Great stress was placed
on the often quoted remarks of Lord Simonds in Kahler v. Midland
Bank? and Bonython v. Australian and those of Lord Wright in
2 Pursuant to ss . 52-54 of the Ontario 7iidicature Act, R.S.O ., 1960,
c. 197 .
3 Supra, footnote 1, at p. 678 .
4 1bid., at p . 680 . Note that the law of Switzerland was not proved .
The court said at p . 680, citing Dicéy's Conflict of Laws (7th ed ., 1958),
p. 1116 : "There being no evidence as to the Swiss law, the Court should,
if the Swiss law were the proper law, apply the lex forl, which in this case
would be the law of Ontario." Quaere : whether this presumption should
apply to foreign statutory law?
5Ibid., p . 717, rule 148 .
6 Ibid., p . 738, rule 148, sub rule 3 . .
7 [1950] A.C . 24,, at p . 28 : "The proper law of a contract means the
law or laws which the parties intended, or may fairly be presumed to have
intended, the contract to be governed."
8 [1951] A.C . 201, at p . 219 : "The mode ofperformance of the obligation
may, and probably will, be determined by English law ; the substance of
the obligation must be determined by the proper law of the contract, i.e .,
the system of law by reference to which the contract was made or that
with which' the transaction has its closest and most real connection. In
the consideration of the latter question, what is the proper law of the
contract, and therefore what is the substance of the obligation created by
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Vita Foods Products v. Unus Shipping Co.,9 and Mt. Albert B.C . v.
Australasian M.L. Ass . Soc . 11 Since, to paraphrase Lord Wright
in the last case, in a situation where the parties have expressed
no intention. at all, the court has to impute an intention or to
determine for the parties what is the proper law which, as just and
reasonable persons, they ought to or would have intended if they
had thought about the question when they made the contract, the
Court of Appeal for Ontario came to the conclusion that it should
apply the law with which the transaction had its closest and most
real connection. In an excellent analysis of all the relevant authori-
ties, the court attempted to reconcile Dicey's views with Westlake's
objective approach." The court said :"
The statement of Lord Simonds in the Bonython case follows Lord
Wright as to contracts which expressly refer to the system of law to be
applied and adopts the language of Westlake as appropriate to other
contracts, presumably those where there was no expressed intention .
There he adopted Dicey's rule as to intention, and presumed intention,
and applied it to a contract in which there was no expressed intention .
I do not think, however, that Lord Simonds' statement in Bonython
is in any sense a departure from his statement in Kahler. At most, it
is a refinement. It is not inconsistent withthe proposition that the
ultimate test is the presumed intention . A presumed intention is as
Singleton L.J., put it in The Assunzione, [1954] P . 150, at p. 176,
it, it is a factor, and sometimes a decisive one, that a particular place is
chosen for performance."
1 [1939] A.C. 277, at p . 290 : "It is true that in questions relating to
the conflict of laws, rules cannot generally be stated in absolute terms
but rather as prima facie presumptions . But where the English rule that
intention is the test applies, and where there is an express statement by
the parties of their intention to select the law of the contract, it is difficult
to see what qualifications are possible, provided the intention expressed
is bona fide and legal, and provided there is no reason for avoiding the
choice on the ground of public policy ."
10 [1938) A.C. 224, at p . 240 : "The proper law of the contract means
that law which the English or other Court is to apply in determining the
obligations under the contract . English law in deciding these matters has
refused to treat as conclusive, rigid or arbitrary, criteria such as lex loci
contractus or lex loci solutionis, and has treated the matter as depending
on the intention of the parties to be ascertained in each case on a consider-
ation of the terms of the contract, the situation of the parties, and generally
on all the surrounding facts . It may be that the parties have in terms in
their agreement expressed what law they intend to govern, and in that
case prima facie their intention will be effectuated by the Court . But in
most cases, they do not do so . The parties may not have thought of the
matter at all . Then the Court has to impute an intention, or to determine
for the parties what is the proper law which, asjust and reasonable persons,
they ought or would have intended if they had thought about the question
when they made the contract . No doubt there are certain prima facie
rules to which a Court in deciding on any particular contract mayturn
for assistance, but they are not conclusive. In this branch of law the
particular rules can only be stated as prima facie presumptions ."
11 Private International Law (7th ed ., 1925), s. 212.
12 Supra, footnote 1, at p . 682.
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"how a just and reasonable person would have regarded the problem."
Dicey, p . 719, suggests as the most satisfactory formulation of the
presumed intention that the proper law is the one with which the
transaction has its closest and most real connection . See Falconbridge,
Conflict of Laws, 2nd ed ., p. 378, where it is pointed out that the :
" `intention' theory seems on its face to be purely subjective in
character, but in effect, if the parties to a contract have not expressly
selected the proper law, the practice of English Courts has been to
ascertain the proper law objectively in the light of the facts and cir-
cumstances of each case, including the place of contracting, the place
of performance, the places of residence or business of the parties
respectively, and the nature and subject matter of the contract."
The most important part of the court's opinion from the point
of view ofjuridical science, and one that will have a great influence
on the development of conflict of laws in Canada, or at least in
Ontario, deals with the test to be adopted in the field of contracts : 13
In seeking to ascertain the intention of the parties as to the proper
law of the contract in the case at bar, in the absence of any expressed
intention, and in the light of these authorities [English cases, Dicey,
Westlake], I think that it should be determined as the one with which
the transaction has its closest and most real connection .
At last, judicial approval is given in Canada to a sensible form-
ula for determining, in the absence of expressed intention, the
proper law. After placing much reliance on the Kahler case,14 the
13 Ibid., at p . 683 .
14 Supra, footnote 7. The court said, supra, footnote 1, at p. 688 :
"After considering all the authorities above mentioned, I would regard
the Kahler case as the one most closely approximating in its facts the
case at bar, for here the parties were both personally present in Austria,
entered into the contract there, and performed a substantial part of the
contract there . I am of the opinion that upon these facts, the system of
law with which the transaction has its closest and most real connection
is the law of Austria."
It is surprising to note that in determining whether the contract had
its closest and most real connection with the law of Austria or Swizerland,
the court found it necessary to rely on precedent . This determination would
appear to be a question of fact-and no two factual situations are alike .
A contract may have factual links with several countries, each of which
has some claim to be considered . There exists such a- multiplicity of
connecting factors, several of which are usually present in the same case
(place where the contract was made, place of performance, domicile,
residence or nationality of the parties, situs of the subject matter of the
contract, and so on) that it is often difficult to select the most significant,
the one which, in turn, will determine the proper law, let alone find a
precedent on all fours with the case at bar . This is particularly true when
a subjective approach is taken by the court .
The court could as well have relied on many other cases where the
law of the place of contracting was held to be the proper law. Actually,
although in both cases the law of the place of contracting contained
exchange control regulations, the facts giving rise to litigation and the
problems involved were quite different . Also, on the whole, there were
more factors pointing to the law of Czechoslovakia in the Kahler case
than pointing to the law of Austria in. Etler v . Kertesz. As to whether the
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court came to the conclusion that the contract had its closest and
most real connection with the law of Austria. Dicey's rule that "a
contractual obligation may be invalidated or discharged by ex-
change control legislation if (a) such legislation is part of the
proper law of the contract""I was applied and the court held in
favour of the defendant : 1s
Since by the law of Austria the contract was invalid, void, and being
prohibited by positive law, illegal and the promise to repay was thus
an illegal consideration, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover upon
the contract .
The Ontario Court of Appeal distinguished the Tornï 17 the
Vita Food" and the Missouri" cases," to reject the plaintiff's con-
tention that the proper law of the contract was that of Switzerland,
where the loan was to be repaid. Handel v . English Exporter Ltd. 21
and Chatenay v. Brazilian Submarine Tel. C0 . 22 were also held to
be distinguishable from the present case, as the court refused to
proper law was correctly ascertained in the Kahler case, see (1950), 3
Int. & Comp. L.Q . Rev . 255 and Mann, Nazi Spoliation in Czechoslovakia
(1950), 13 Mod. L . Rev . 206 .
It is submitted that the passage quoted from Lord Simonds' speech
and relied upon by the court :
"What then is the proper law of the contract that was made with
the Zivnostenska Bk., and that I have assumed to have been renewed
with the Bohemian Bk? In my opinion, it was the law of Czechoslo-
vakia. The contract was made in that country between an individual
and a corporation both resident there . At the date of the contract and
at the material times thereafter the law of Czechoslovakia included a
law regulating transactions in foreign exchange substantially the same
as that which prevailed at the date of the issue of the writ . At all
material times it was illegal for the bank, Zivnostenska or Bohemian,
to part with foreign securities in its custody without the consent of
the National Bk. or other proper authority, whether those securities
were at the date of the contract in fact situate in Czechoslovakia or
in some other country . In these circumstances I cannot accede to the
contention of the appellant that the proper law of the contract so far
as it concerns the delivery of the securities is governed by the law of
England or of any other country in which they may chance to be
situate."
only shows the process his lordship followed in that case in order to reach
the conclusion that the law of Czechoslovakia was the one most closely
connected with the contract .is Op . cit ., footnote 4, rule 178, p . 919 .
18 Supra, footnote 1, at p. 688 .
it The Torni, [1932] P. 78 . 18 Supra, footnote 9 .
11 Be Missouri S.S. Co . (1888), 42 Ch . D . 321 .
20 Supra, footnote 1, at p . 685 : "I think that the Torni, Vita Foods and
Missouri cases are all distinguishable from the case at bar, first in that on
the face of the contracts in question, the express or apparent intention
of the parties was that the law of England should apply, and secondly,
in that in each case by the foreign law under consideration, the contracts
were invalid or void, but not illegal as being prohibited by a positive law."
21 [19551 L1.L.R. 317 .
22 (1891), 1 Q.B . 79, per Esher M.R ., at pp . 82-3 .
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give, weight to a 'presumption that the parties to a contract would
intend to make a valid one :"
The last two mentioned authorities, in my opinion, are distinguishable
from the case at bar on the facts : I do not think that either of these
authorities laid down any general rule to the effect that the proper
law of a contract as between the laws of two countries, by one of which
it would be valid, and by the other it would be invalid, should be
presumed to be in the country where the contract would be valid .
Under'certain circumstances such a consideration might have some
weight viewed together with all the other evidence from which intention
might be inferred .
Finally, the court was of the opinion that :24
. . . the law of Austria relating to foreign exchange, under which the
transaction, without the required consent would be illegal, is not in
my opinion, a law of such a penal or confiscatory nature that it should
be disregarded by the Courts of this country . This law is similar in
its effect to the law in force in Canada in 1947, prohibiting dealings
in foreign exchange except through certain authorized dealers .25
Thé great merit of the decision of the Court of Appeal for
Ontario is that it clarifies the doctrine of the proper law of a con-
tract, a doctrine that has been applied on several occasions in
Canada.26 There is, unfortunately, no unanimity in the common-
law provinces on the exact meaning of the expression "proper
law", especially in the absence of expressed intention . Etler v.
KerteSZ 27 now stands for the proposition that, in the absence of
expressed intention, the system of law with which a contract has
its closest and most real connection determines the question wheth-
er an obligation has been validly created. 28
23 Supra, footnote 1, at p . 687 . Although the court could be criticized
for relying so heavily on English authority, this rather mechanical approach
can readily be understood in a field that has been called "the most con-
fused subject in the conflict of laws" : Morris, The Eclipse of the Lex
Solutionis-A Fallacy Exploded (1953), 6 Vand. L . Rev. 505 . Breaking
new ground should be done carefully .24 ibid., at p . 688 .2s The Foreign Exchange Control Act, 1946, c. 53, repealed in 1952
by The Currency, Mint and Exchange Fund Act, S.C ., 1952, c. 40, s. 30,
now R.S.C., 1952, c. 315 .
28 See Castel, Private International Law (1960), p . 196 .
27 Supra, footnote 1 .23 The parties are presumed to have selected the law most substantially
connected .
Not all matters affecting a contract should necessarily be governed by
one law, although this principle seems to be implied from the general
language of the court. See also an earlier decision of the Ontario Court
of Appeal, Charron v. Montreal Trust Co ., [1958] O.R. 597, to the effect
that capacity to contract is governed by the proper law . As Professor
Cheshire, Private International Law (5th ed., 1957), p. 205, points out :
"The correct inquiry is not - what law governs a contract? It is - What
law governs the particular question raised in the instant proceedings?
Different questions may well be determinable by different laws." Problems
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An important step has been taken in Ontario, which accords
with modern theories in the field of conflict of laws, and shows a
complete departure from conceptualist theories . With one excep
tion, the proper law of a contract is the law of the country in
which it may be regarded as localized . This localization is indicated
by the grouping of all the elements, factual or otherwise, in the
transaction.
In this context the presumption in favour of the lex loci con-
tractus or the lex loci solutionis is of little value. The contract
must be regarded as a whole. "The proper course is not to begin
with a presumption and then inquire whether there are rebutting
circumstances, but to fall back on a presumption only when the
circumstances, viewed as a whole, fail to reveal with reasonable
certainty the law to which the contract naturally belongs." 11
It is unfortunate that the Court of Appeal expressed the doc-
trine of the proper law in terms of presumed intention, so as to
appear to reconcile the subjective and objective tests . How can the
court infer from the terms and circumstances of the contract what
the common intention of the parties would have been, had they
considered the matter at the time when the contract was made?
In order to be able to rely on the opinion of Lord Simonds in the
Kahler case" and that of Lord Wright in Mt. Albert,31 to the effect
that the proper law means the law by which the parties intended
or may fairly be presumed to have intended the contract to be
governed, the court was forced to impute to the parties an intention
to stand by the legal system which, "having regard to the incidence
of the connecting factors and of the circumstances generally, the
contract appears most properly to belong"."
It is amyth to regard the opinion of the court as the fulfillment
of the common intention of the parties.33 Reference to their pre-
of conflict of laws in the field of contracts must be broken down into
groups, so that different types of social, economic, business and govern-
ment interests may receive separate consideration . No single rule should
be applied to all types of contract and to all its aspects . Yet a contract
should not be split readily or without good reason . Lord MacDermott
dissenting in the Kahler case, supra, footnote 7, at p . 42 : "Though there
is no authority binding your Lordships to the view that there can be but
one proper law in respect of any given contract, it is doubtless true to say
that the courts of this country will not split the contract in this sense
readily or without good reason."
29 Cheshire, ibid., p. 211, referring to Re Anglo-Austrian Bank, [19201
1 Ch . 69 .
ao Supra, footnote 7 . 81 Supra, footnote 10 .
32 Cheshire, op . cit., footnote 28, p. 211 .
33Ibid., pp . 209-210. See also Lord Norman in the Kahler case, supra,
footnote 7, at p . 37 : "To ask what law the parties intended to govern the
contracts is to ask a question that admits only one artificial answer."
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sumed intention was not necessary and detracts from the per-
suasiveness and logical value of the principle laid down by the
court. In most cases, the parties have not thought of the proper
law at all. Why must the court, in the words of Lord Wright,
impute an intention or determine for the parties what is the proper
law which "as just and reasonable persons, they ought or would
have intended if they had thought about the question when they
made the contract" . A simpler formulation of this subjective ap-
proach is that adopted by Singleton L.J . in the Assunzione case,34
where he says that a presumed intention is "how a just and reason-
able person would have regarded the problem" .
Let us do away with the criterion of presumed intention and
say forthwith that the proper law of a contract is the law which
the parties expressly intended to apply (subjective test) or, in the
absence of expressed intention, that with which the contract has
the most substantial connection (objective test). A rule . that
combines the expressed intention theory with the law most sub-
stantially connected is logical and gives desirable flexibility to the
proper law doctrine. It allows for adequate consideration and
weighing of all the social and economic factors involved in the
situations presented for adjudication." No greater certainty is
needed.-As Professor Cook points out," the presumed intention
theory seems, on the whole, to be a somewhat cumbersome and
misleading way of expressing a rule that the law to be applied is
that of the place with which the agreement on the whole has a
substantial or vital connection . Conflicts specialists will no doubt
regret that the court did not discard the presumed intention theory .
What still remains in doubt in Ontario, as well as in the rest
of Canada, is the extent to which the parties to a contract may ex-
pressly select as the proper law any law in the world, or whether
their choice must be restricted to some lawwith which the contract
is already factually connected .37 Severaljudicial dicta seem to admit
unrestricted freedom of choice . In the celebrated Vita Food case,
Lord Wright ae thought that it is sufficient for the intention ex-
pressed to be "bona fide and legal" . He did not believe that con-
34 [1954] P . 150, at p . 176 .
3s Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (1942),
p. 431 .
38 Aid_ p. 418 .
17 It is important to carefully distinguish the express selection of the
proper law to govern a contract as a whole, from the quite different
process of incorporation in the contract of certain domestic provisions
of a foreign law .
' 38 Supra, footnote, 10, at p . 290 .
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nection with the law expressly selected is essential.* On the other
hand, especially with respect to illegality, it is questionable whether
the parties may expressly select alaw that makes the contract valid,
when it would be invalid by the proper law ascertained objectively.
Recently, Upjohn J., in re Claim of Helbert Wagg & Co. Ltd., 40
seemed to have been of the opinion that the courts should not
necessarily be bound by the expressed intention of the parties,
where the system of law chosen has no real or substantial connec-
tion with the contract, looked upon as a whole. Of course, there
is no problem if the law expressly selected is also the proper law
by application of objective standards.
It hasbeen argued with great force that the preliminary question
whether the parties are contractually bound the one to the other
must, in the nature of things, be governed by a law independent
oftheir volition, that is, by the proper law ascertained objectively.41
The parties should not by any contractual provision render in-
trinsically valid a contract that is intrinsically invalid by its proper
law ascertained objectively. The law expressly selected should have
some connection with the agreement," otherwise "allowing the
parties to choose the law in this regard involves a delegation of
sovereign power to private individuals" .43 In other words, the
3s See also Lord Atkin, in Rex v. International Trustee, [1937] A.C.
500, at p . 529 : "Their intention will be ascertained by the intention ex-
pressed in the contract, if any, which will be conclusive."
40 [19561 Ch . 323, at p . 341 .
41 Cheshire, op . tit ., footnote 28, p . 216, citing Wharton, The Conflict
of Laws (3rd ed . by Parmele 1905), Vol. II, p . 900, s . 427e and Boissevain
v. Weil, [1949] 1 K.B. 82, at pp . 490-1 where Denning L.J. said : "Not-
withstanding what was said in Vita Food Products v . Unus Shipping Co.,
I do not believe that parties are free to stipulate by what law the validity
of their contract is to be determined . Their intention is only one of the
factors to be taken into account."
42 See the new approach taken by the American Conflicts Restatement
Second, ss . 332, 332a, 332b in Cavers, Re-Restating the Conflict of Laws :
The Chapter on Contracts (XXth Century Comparative and Conflict of
Laws (1961), p . 349). Also Batiffol, Traité élémentaire de droit inter-
national privé (3rd ed ., 1959), s . 585, p . 638 : " . . . la loi d'autonomie est
celle qui se déduit de la localisation du contrat telle qu'elle résulte de la
volonté des parties quant à la répartition territoriale et l'importance
respective des différents éléments de leur opération ." and s. 570, p . 618 :
. . . Celle-ci [position traditionelle] consiste à notre sens en ce que la loi
applicable au contrat est determinée par le juge, mais en raison de la
volonté des parties quant à la localisation du contrat . L'explication de
cette formule appelle le developpement des deux propositions qu'elle
implique, à savoir : 1° la localisation du contrat dépend de son économie
donc de la volonté des parties : 2° l'objet propre de la volonté des parties
est la localisation du contrat, non le choix de la loi ." See also s. 574, p .
624, "Liberté des parties dans la désignation de la loi applicable", and
Batiffol, Public Policy and the Autonomy of the Parties : Interrelation
Between Imperative Legislation and the Doctrine of Party Autonomy
(The Conflict of Laws and International Contracts (1949), p. 69) .
43 Lorenzen, Validity and Effect of Contracts in the Conflict of Laws
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creation of an obligation should not be a matter to be left to the
discretion of the parties.44
In Canada, however, we are still bound by the decision of the
Privy Council in the Vita Food case,45 and it would seem that the
parties are free to submit the validity of their contract to any law
of their ownchoosing, so long as this choice is "bonafide and legal"
and there is no reason for avoiding the choice on the ground of
public policy . More than twenty years later, it is still not clear
what meaning is to be attached to the words "bonafide and legal" .
Although it could be argued that the choice of the parties is not
in good faith, if the transaction in question has no real and sub-
stantial connection with the state whose law is selected, this does
not appear to be the logical conclusion to be derived from the
Vita Food case .46 Why should the parties be limited to choosing
from the rules of decision found in the system of law in force in
one of the legal units with which the agreement has a substantial
or some connection? 47
The application of the rule of expressed intent is limited, of
course, by the principle that the forum may refuse to apply the
stipulated law on the ground that it infringes the forum's public
policy or because the parties could not have achieved the desired
result under the foreign law applicable by the objective test. They
must not try to evade the imperative provisions (that would make
the contract illegal or void) of that legal system with which the
contract has its most substantial connection and which, for this
reason, the court would, in the absence of an expressed intention,
have applied."' Professor Cheshire goes a step further and main-
tains that "the courts will not allow it [Vita Food case] to disturb
the principle that the parties are not free to choose the law by
which the validity of their contract is to be determined" .49 This
attitude would seem reasonable if a distinction were made between
(1920), 30 Yale L . Rev. 654, at p . 658 ; E. Gérli & Co. v . Cunard SS. Co .
(1931), 48 F . 2d . 115, per Learned Hand J., at p . 117'.
44 See The Torni, supra, footnote 19 . Contra:. Vita Food Products v . Units
Shipping Co., supra, footnote 9 .
46 Ibid. 'Although appeals to the Judicial Committee in, civil , matters
were abolished in 1949, one must 'assume that this "does not affect the
authority of its earlier decisions until and unless the Supreme Court of
Canada, in its new role of sovereign and ultimate, court of appeal for
Canada, chooses to depart from them. . . ." Friedmann, Stare- Decisis at
Common Law and Under the Civil Code of Quebec (1953), 31 Can. Bar
Rev. 723, at p . 731 .
46 Ibid.
47 In general, for an analysis of. the intention theory, see Cook, op . cit .,
footnote 35, Ch. XV, p . 388 et seq.
46 Dicey, op. cit., footnote 4, rul.- .148, sub rule 1, p . 724 et seq
49 Op. cit., footnote 3 .
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questions ofvalidity and questions ofperformance or construction .
If the modern unitary approach to the proper law of a contract is
taken, it appears to be somewhat extreme to limit the parties'
express choice to a law having the most substantial or, for that
matter, any contact with the case, when no evasion is contemplated.
That there must be some limits to the choice of law by the
parties is admitted by all, including the Judicial Committee . The
courts should not help the parties to evade the clear and strong
public policy of any of the states connected with the agreement or
at least that with which it is most substantially connected."
It would seem reasonable to conclude that the contract should
have some connection with the chosen law, and that the application
of this law should not be contrary to a fundamental policy of the
state that would be the state of the governing law in the absence
of an express choice by the parties. Should the law chosen run
counter to the law of another state which, but for the parties'
choice, would possess some colour of having the most significant
relationship with the contract, the ,parties favoured by the latter
law could always compel the court to decide whether the state's
colourable claim is valid and, if so, whether its law embodies a
fundamental policy. Otherwise, there seems to be no theoretical
or practical objection to giving effect to the expressed intention of
the parties when the choice is limited to the law of some jurisdiction
with which the agreement has some connection, whether substantial
or not, and the public policy of the forum or that of the legal
system most substantially connected does not indicate a contrary
decision. To allow absolute freedom of choice would place a
possibly inconvenient burden on the forum and perhaps too often
lead to a clash with the public policy of the states having a direct
interest in the agreements'
The other point, deserving attention here, arises from a dis-
cussion by the court in Etler v . Kertesz ofthe Handel" and Chatenay
cases," which were cited by the plaintiff as supporting the view
that "the proper law of a contract as between the laws oftwocoun-
5oFor instance, where, by the law most substantially connected with
the agreement entered into, the making of that kind of agreement is a
criminal offence, the parties may not make it valid by choosing a law which
does not forbid such an agreement . Note that in the Vita Food case,
supra, footnote 9, the law of Newfoundland was said not to " . . . make
the contract illegal so as to nullify the contract . There was no sufficient
ground for refusing to give effect to the express or implied intention of
the parties that the proper or substantive law of the contract, that is, the
law by which it was to be enforced and governed should be English law."
Per Lord Wright, at p . 299 .
51 Cook, op. cit ., footnote 25, p . 418 .
52 Supra, footnote 27 . 11 Supra, footnote 28 .
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tries, by one of which it would be valid, and by the other it would
be invalid, should be presumed to be in the country where the
contract wouldbe valid" .54 The Court ofAppeal was of the opinion
that these cases did riot lay down such a wide proposition and were
distinguishable from the present case . Porter C.J.O . was careful,
however, to point out that "under certain circumstances, such a
consideration might have some weight viewed together with all the
other evidence from which the intention might be inferred" .55 In
fact, one would be tempted to say that the circumstances were
such as to make . the lex validitatis (Switzerland) the proper law
of the contract .
It has often been said that the courts may incline towards ap-
plying a system of law that validates the contract, on the ground
that the parties cannot be assumed to have intended the contract
to be governed by a law making it invalid . If one adopts the ap-
proach taken by the Ontario Court of Appeal, that it is the law
presumably intended by the parties that must be ascertained and
applied, one could not imagine the parties ever selecting a law
that would make their contract illegal and void . How could the
parties be presumed to have contemplated alaw that would defeat
their engagements?" Only on a purely objective determination of
the proper law would such a consideration be irrelevant .
The application of the lex validitatis is not without eminent
supporters, both ancient and modern." In the United States of
54 Supra, footnote 1, p . 686 . bs Ibid., p . 687 ." Pritchard v . Norton (1882), 106 U.S . 134, at p . 137 . See also the
Kahler case, supra, footnote 7, per Lord MacDermott, at p . 41 : "Why
should he intend that his right to deal with his securities abroad should
be regulated by those restrictions? I can see no ground for attributing
any such intention to him . On the contrary, it is I think but reasonable to
assume that his confidence and hope in regard to these securities must
have rested on the laws of the countries where they were placed and where
as yet there was freedom and peace."
67 As early as 1879, Roger (American Interstate Law (1879), p. 50)
wrote that when the validity of a contract involves the laws of two or
more states, and it is not expressly apparent which the parties had in view,
then that law which is most favourable to validity will be regarded as the
law of the contract. See also Savigny to the effect that " . . . it is certainly
not to be presumed that the parties intended to subject themselves to a
local law entirely opposed to their purpose ." The Conflict of Laws (2nd
ed . rev ., Guthrie trans ., 1880), pp. 223-4.
Wharton was also of the opinion that : "It is always to be presumed
that persons agree effectually to do that which they contract ; and if so,
this agreement becomes part of the contract, overriding such local law as
does not rest on a ground distinctly moral or political . And when there
is a conflict of possible applicatory laws, the parties are presumed to have
made part of their agreement that law which is most favourable to its
peformance ." (op. cit ., footnote 41, p . 945, s . 429) ; and see Lorenzen,
Selected Articles on the Conflict of Laws (1947), pp . 298-299 ; Stumberg,
Conflict of Laws (2nd ed ., 1951), pp . 225, 237-240 ; Cavers, A Critique of
the Choice .of Law Problem (1933), 47 Harv. L . Rev. 173, at p . 190 .
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America, Professor Ehrenzweig states : 58
The principle that a contract will be upheld whenever possible-the
favor negocil -is well established in the municipal laws of all countries .
Whenever the court's choice is between the application of an invalidat-
ing rule and a validating rule, it will apply the latter. The lex validitatis
in conflict cases is only an application of this almost self-evident
postulate . . . .
and he adds
Once it is conceded that a forum, in enforcing a foreign contract, is
not limited to enforcing rights vested under the foreign law, and that
courts will endeavour to give effect to the parties' intention wherever
possible, the invalidation of any foreign contract that is valid under
the lex for! should be expected to occur only in very exceptional
circumstances .
Courts have often applied the lex validitatis in an unorthodox
fashion and without openly acknowledging the fact, by selecting
that law, among the possible laws applicable, under which the
contract could be held valid in accordance with the parties' pre-
sumed intention . It is in this way that one could interpret the
passages quoted from the two cases cited by the plaintiff in Eder
v. Kertesz.19
An examination of the facts of Eder v. Kertesz reveals the
following points of contact with Austrian law : the loan was made
in Vienna and was illegal there, and the parties "at times resided
and worked in Vienna"." The claim to the application of Swiss
law was based on the fact that the loan was to be repaid in Zurich
and was valid by the law of that country. If we look at the other
elements present, we find that the loan was in United States dollars
to be repaid in the same currency . Austrian currency was never
involved in the transaction," and the dollars had been obtained
es Contracts in the Conflict of Laws. Part One Validity (1959), 59
Col. L . Rev . 973, at pp . 992, 1021, footnotes omitted .
11 Hendel v . English Exporters Ltd., supra, footnote 21, and Chatenay
v. Brazilian Submarine Tel. Co., supra, footnote 22. The Missouri case,
supra, footnote 19, could also be put in this category . And see Hamlyn v .
Talisker Distillery, [1894] A.C. 202 . In the British Columbia case of
Rosencrantz v. Union Contractors (1960), 31 W.W.R. 597, 23 D.L.R .
(2d) 473 (comment in (1961), 39 Can . Bar Rev . 93), the lex validitatis
seems to have been rejected . Perhaps cases involving illegality should be
subject to considerations different from those obtaining when other
problems are involved .
eo Dates are not disclosed, supra, footnote 1, p . 675 .
61 This fact could indicate that the parties intended the law of the
United States to govern the contract .
It is interesting to note that no attempt was made to invoke the lex
for! (Canada) in order to prevent the enforcement of a contract made in
violation of the law of a member of the International Monetary Fund .
It is well established that, whatever their proper law and wherever they
are to be performed, exchange contracts are unenforceable if they involve
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by the plaintiff before coming to Austria.e 2 The opinion of the
court does not disclose the nationality of the parties; which one
may assume to be Hungarian, nor their actual residence, andplace
of business at the time of the loan. Furthermore, the defendant
was about to leave Austria for the United States of America. It
seems, therefore, reasonable to conclude that the connection with
the law of Austria is not as decisive, as it might first appear, to be .
The result would have been just as convincing if the court had
found that the proper law of the contract was that of Switzerland.
In fact, what the court did was to apply the presumption in favour
of the lex loci contractus and to justify it, on the ground that it -was
most closely connected with the. transaction . Support for the con-
clusion reached by the court rests on the fact that the validity of
the contract was at stake. The court must also have felt disinclined
to apply the law of Switzerland, which validated the contract, on
the ground that, to do so, would condone :the violation of the
exchange control regulations of Austria, d friendly country, when
these regulations were neither penal nor confiscatory, àiid thereby
possibly jeopardize the good relations existing between Canada
and Austria.
Professor Ehrenzweig is forced to recognize that, in practice,
the currency of, any member of the International Monetary Fund and if
they are contrary to the exchange control regulations of any member .
Dicey, 6p . cit., footnote. 4, . rule 178 . Canada and Austria are members of
the Fund and article VIII (2)(b) which provides that : " Exchange con-
tracts which involve the currency of any member and which are contrary
to the exchange control regulations of that member maintained or imposed
consistently with this Agreement shall be unenforceable in the territories
of any member . . .", is part of the law of Canada (The Bretton Woods
Agreement Act, S.C ., 1945, c . 11, now R.S.C., 1952, c . 19).
Thus, as far as Canadian law is concerned, respect for foreign exchange
control restrictions is statutory . Article VIII (2)(b) applies, however, only
where the regulations are those of the member whose currency is "involv-
ed", which was not the case here. See "Interpretation of Art . VIII (2)(b)
of the International Monetary Fund Agreement by the Board of Execu-
tive Directors of the International Monetary Fund (made pursuant to
Art. XVIII)", Annual Report of the International Monetary Fund. (1949),
p . 82 et seq. See also (1954), 3 Int. & Comp. L . Q . Rev. 262 : Are these
rules of interpretation binding on Canadian courts asked to deal with a
Canadian statute? By finding that the law of .Austria was the proper law,
the court avoided the difficulty. Austrian exchange control legislation was
applied by virtue of a conflict-of-laws rule of the forum and not by reason
of membership in the International Monetary Fund . It could be argued
that the court should have regarded the Austrian restrictions creating
illegality as a temporary expedient to deal with an emergency situation .
Such restrictions would not affect the 'substantive obligations to pay but
merely defer the date of payment .
62 The loan could not, therefore, have done any harm to the Austrian
economy (except' perhaps in the sense that, if the plaintiff had exchanged
his dollars for Austrian currency, he would have strengthened the schilling) .
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the courts have been inclined to give effect to the invalidating
policies of foreign countries. He says : 13
"Comity of nations" while nearly defunct as a general theory has been
quite effective in this field with regard to certain kinds of contracts .
Among the cases most frequently arising are those involving the
currency laws of other nations, and Lord Mansfield's famous dictum
that "foreign revenue laws" will not be noticed has been significantly
counteracted. Whether because of a certain international solidarity in
financial matters, or because of special international agreements,
American courts seem to be willing to strike down contracts concluded
in violation of the currency laws of foreign countries, even when
the political relations with the foreign country are not conducive to
comity . Similarly, many cases in which English courts have purported
to apply the "proper law" for the purpose of invalidating a contract
involved currency laws or similar regulatory measures of foreign
countries . . . .
Even in this field, however, the Rule of Validation prevails when govern-
mental interests recede. This is true, for instance, when neither party
owes allegiance to the invalidating law, or when a domestic contact with
the transaction, such as the forum is being the place of performance,
creates a competing domestic private interest. Principally, the forum
will not permit a debtor to hide behind foreign currency laws to escape
a morally cogent obligation. 64
From the point of view of conflicts theory, there is no doubt
that Etler v. Kertesz ss is of great importance . In spite of its de-
ficiencies, mainly its nominal adherence to the fiction of presumed
intent, it will certainly rank among the leading cases in the field,
and it is hoped that, with some qualifications, it will be followed
elsewhere in Canada . 66
J.-G.C .
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND THE FATAL ACCIDENTS ACT-
LIABILITY OF THE DECEASED'S ESTATE.-Every year thousands of
Canadians suffer financial loss as the result of fatal accidents . In
a large proportion of these cases contributory negligence on the
part of the deceased was a factor in the mishap . Following the
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Littley v. Brooks and
Canadian National Ry. Co.,' persons who bring an action under
63 op . cit., footnote 58, at p . 1022, footnotes omitted .
64 Italics mine . 66 Supra, footnote 1 .
66 The court should be commended for its liberal attitude as to who
may be a competent witness . The decision is also of value on the question
of enforcement of Quebec judgments in Ontario, and the doctrine of
identity where the foreign law has been alleged but not proved.
[19321 S.C.R . 462 .
